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Stanislav

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Incident: Abu Dhabi DH8C at Abu Dhabi on Sep 9th 2012, passenger detects engine overheat

An Abu Dhabi Aviation de Havilland Dash 8-300, registration A6-ADB performing flight AXU-711 from Abu Dhabi to Das Island (United Arab Emirates) with 46 passengers and 3 crew, was preparing for departure when during engine start a passenger seated in the right hand seat row 6 observed fluid coming out of the right hand engine's vent. He commented to his friend in the window seat this was not right but thought this was due to condensation. The fluid however dissipated, the aircraft continued to taxi to the runway. The passenger's attention was now focussed on the engine nacelle, he spotted some hot spot with fumes from the vents at the engine nacelle, but still thought this was due to some residual fluid. The fumes however were continuing and the white colour of the vents changed to brown then black. Shortly prior to the takeoff roll the passenger began waving his hands to attract the attention by the flight attendants, the aircraft however had been cleared for an immediate takeoff from runway 13R and commenced takeoff. After the aircraft had become airborne the flight attendant checked with the passenger and subsequently informed the flight deck about something not right with the right hand engine. The first officer (30, 2150 hours total, 1100 hours on type) left his seat to have a look at the engine while the aircraft climbed through about 2300 feet, at that point the exterior of the panel had already started to blister and bare metal had become visible. The first officer returned to the cockpit informing the captain (47, 9500 hours total, 4500 hours on type) there was a fire inside the right hand engine's nacelle, the crew declared PAN while the aircraft was climbing through 4000 feet towards 5000 feet on a downwind, the crew reported there were signs of fire on the right hand engine. All cockpit indications remained normal, no fire warning occurred, the crew therefore did not discharge the fire bottles. The crew decided to return to runway 13R with both engines operating and shut the right hand engine down after roll out, the cabin was prepared for a possible evacuation. The aircraft landed safely on runway 13R about 10 minutes after departure, the right hand engine was shut down, emergency services in attendance reported no fire, the aircraft taxied to the apron on the #1 engine.


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An Emirates Airlines Airbus A380-800, registration A6-EDQ performing flight EK-805 from Dubai (United Arab Emirates) to Jeddah (Saudi Arabia), burst a number of tyres on landing in Jeddah but came to a safe stop.

After the tyres were replaced the aircraft was able to depart Jeddah and reached Dubai on its return flight EK-806 with a delay of 10.5 hours.


Stanislav

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Incident: Qantas A388 near Sydney on Oct 31st 2012, strong smell
By Simon Hradecky, created Wednesday, Oct 31st 2012 15:23Z, last updated Wednesday, Oct 31st 2012 15:23Z

A Qantas Airbus A380-800, registration VH-OQF performing flight QF-1 from Sydney,NS (Australia) to Singapore (Singapore) with 271 people on board, was enroute at FL300 about 400nm northwest of Sydney about 70 minutes into the flight when the crew decided to return to Sydney due to a strong smell on board. The aircraft descended to FL280 for the return and landed safely on Sydney's runway 34L about 60 minutes later.

The airline confirmed the return as a precaution due to a "very strong smell" on board. The cause of the smell is under investigation.


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Incident: Aerosvit B735 at Donetsk on Sep 22nd 2012, temporary runway excursion during landing
By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, Nov 1st 2012 00:20Z, last updated Thursday, Nov 1st 2012 00:20Z

An Aerosvit Boeing 737-500, registration UR-AAK performing flight VV-324 from Larnaca (Cyprus) to Donetsk (Ukraine), was on final approach to Donetsk's runway 26 in moderate rain and winds from 316 degrees at 16 knots. About 17 seconds prior to touch down the winds suddenly changed to 149 degrees at 5 knots resulting in a loss of airspeed and an increased vertical speed causing the aircraft to touch down harder than normal (vertical acceleration 1.75G, rate of descent 152 fpm above limit), the aircraft subsequently veered to the right, exited the runway and went over soft ground for about 400 meters before the aircraft returned onto the runway, slowed without further incident and taxied to the apron. The nose wheel tyres received serious cuts, the main gear tyres minor cuts, the crew subsequently informed tower about their runway excursion.

Ukraine's Ministry of Transport reported in their monthly bulletin horizontal visibility had been 1100 meters during the approach, the aircraft encountered windshear between 25 and 17 seconds before touch down. The first officer, pilot monitoring, noticed the deviation from stabilized approach but did not call out the excessive sink rate below 500 feet AGL. The investigation determined the cause of the runway excursion was a combination of the change of wind direction at the time of landing and hydroplaning, a contributing factor was the crew's disregard of possible hydroplaning in the conditions present.

Metars:
UKCC 221600Z 04002MPS 2000 -SHRA BKN030CB BKN083 16/15 Q1012 08290347 TEMPO VRB10G18MPS 1100 TSRAGR SQ BKN004 BKN015CB
UKCC 221530Z 00000MPS 3000 VCTSC -SHRA BKN030CB BKN066 17/15 Q1012 08290347 TEMPO VRB10G18MPS 1100 TSRAGR SQ BKN004 BKN015CB
UKCC 221500Z 22002MPS 150V280 4700 -TSRA BKN030CB BKN066 17/15 Q1013 08290347 TEMPO VRB10G18MPS 1100 TSRAGR SQ BKN004 BKN015CB
UKCC 221430Z 20007MPS 160V230 1600 TSRA BKN024 BKN020CB 18/15 Q1012 08290347 TEMPO VRB10G18MPS 1100 TSRAGR SQ BKN004 BKN015CB
UKCC 221400Z 24004MPS 9999 SCT030CB BKN083 21/14 Q1011 26090070 TEMPO VRB10G18MPS 1100 TSRAGR SQ BKN004 BKN015CB
UKCC 221330Z VRB01MPS 9000 SCT030CB BKN083 22/14 Q1011 26090070 TEMPO -TSRA BKN020CB
UKCC 221300Z 20002MPS 150V270 9999 SCT030CB BKN083 22/14 Q1011 08090070 TEMPO -TSRA BKN020CB
UKCC 221230Z VRB01MPS 9999 SCT033CB BKN100 22/14 Q1011 08090070 TEMPO -TSRA BKN020CB
UKCC 221200Z 15002MPS 110V180 9999 SCT033CB BKN100 22/14 Q1011 08090070 TEMPO -TSRA BKN020CB
UKCC 221130Z 17003MPS 110V230 9999 SCT033CB BKN100 22/14 Q1011 08090070 NOSIG
UKCC 221100Z 15004MPS 070V210 CAVOK 23/14 Q1011 08090070 NOSIG


Stanislav

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Incident: Air France A343 near Guadeloupe on Jul 22nd 2011, rapid climb and approach to stall in upset
By Simon Hradecky, created Friday, May 11th 2012 18:19Z, last updated Friday, Nov 2nd 2012 08:17Z

The French BEA released their final report in French (later released English version) concluding the probable cause of the serious incident was:

Inadequate monitoring of flight parameters, which resulted in the crew not noticing the autopilot had disconnected and a deviation from assigned altitude after reflex actions at the controls.

Contributing factors were:

- the aural alert "Autopilot Disconnect" was not heard because the simultaneous aural alert "Overspeed" had priority

- the turbulence experienced at the beginning of the upset made reading the instruments difficult

- the "severe turbulence checklist" item to verify whether the autopilot was still engaged was not carried out

- inappropriate use of the weather radar permitted entry into a zone of turbulence

The captain (48, ATPL, 23,226 hours total, 3,081 hours on type) was pilot flying, the first officer (50, ATPL, 9,647 hours total, 2,410 hours on type) was pilot monitoring.

During climb, at about FL180, both crew members adjusted their navigation displays to a range of 320nm, the weather radar was set to maximum gain and a tilt angle to alternate between -0.5 and -1.0 degrees.

The aircraft was enroute at FL350 and a speed of 0.83 mach about 2nm after passing N18 W60 the aircraft entered a zone of moderate turbulence, an "OVERSPEED" aural alert sounded and the master warning illuminated. The airspeed had increased to 0.87 mach. The flight data recorder revealed that the pilot monitoring pressed the autopilot disconnect button, no aural alert sounded, and pulled the side stick about 75% of its travel back for about 6 seconds. The aircraft subsequently rolled right and left indicative that the pilot not flying was not aware of his actions. The airspeed reduces to 0.84 mach, the overspeed warning stops briefly for two seconds, activates again for a second, then silences. At this time the aircraft climbs at a vertical speed of 1950 feet per minute. The master warning stops a second later. The crew selected mach 0.76 for about 3 seconds, then mach 0.85, the spoilers were extended. The airspeed reduces.

The pilot flying reported that as reaction to the turbulence encounter he activated the landing lights in order to be seen and see, he noticed there was rain outside. He then wanted to take the handset for an public announcement but dropped the hand set. The pilot monitoring retrieved the handset and made the announcement to the passengers.

The pitch attitude in the meantime increased from 3 to 9 degrees in 5 seconds, and the aircraft climbed through 35,200 feet. The crew reported later they did not hear the altitude alerter that sounds upon deviating 200 feet from the assigned altitude, the spoilers begin to automatically reduce, 10 seconds after the begin of the upset the aircraft climbed through FL360, the spoilers fully retracted, the pitch angle reached 12 degrees nose up, the mach decreases. The pilot flying noticed the decreasing speed and selected Mach 0.93, the aircraft still climbs, the vertical speed increases through 5700 feet per minute, the crew does not notice the excessive climb rate, engine N1 is at 100%, the pilot flying switches his navigation display to a range of 160nm.

29 seconds after the upset began, the aircraft was climbing through 36,900 feet, the pilot monitoring noticed the master warning had illuminated.

44 seconds after the upset, the aircraft was climbing through 37,950 feet, the pilot flying disengaged autothrust and advanced the power levers into the TO/GA detent.

53 seconds after the upset began the aircraft reached its maximum altitude at 38,185 feet at a mach speed of 0.66.

The pilot flying realizsed at that point they were at 38,000 feet and queried the pilot not flying whether they weren't assigned to FL350.

78 seconds after the upset began the aircraft descended through FL370, the pilot flying pulls the altitude select button on the master control panel which activates the open descend mode on the flight directors. The pilot wants the autopilot to reacquire FL350, but notices nothing is displayed on the primary flight display. The airspeed is 226 knots, 19 knots below the minimum selectable airspeed. Both flight directors are then withdrawn from the displays.

At this time the pilot not flying performed a HF transmission with New York Oceanic Center to inform abotu the altitude deviation and turbulence encounter.

102 seconds after the upset began, the aircraft was descending through 36,500 feet, the pilot flying finally notices the autopilot had disconnected and begins to operate his side stick. The pitch angle subsequently stabilizes, while descending through 35,400 feet the autopilot gets reconnected, the aircraft levels off at FL350, autothrust gets reengaged and the aircraft stabilizes.

Air France Operations Center sent an ACARS message about 5:15 minutes after the upset began indicating that there was nothing visible around N18 W60 on a satellite image and there was no clear air turbulence forecast as well.

The aircraft continued for a safe landing in Paris about 7.5 hours later.

The BEA reported the weather briefing available to the crew showed no significant weather phenomen along their route. This however stood in contrast to infrared satellite images which showed the presence of isolated cumulonimbus clouds of moderate intensity around N18 W60 with tops reaching up to FL380. The trajctory of the aircraft took the aircraft in close vicinity of those clouds.

The BEA analysed that Airbus recommends the use of weather radar tilt angles depending on range settings, to detect water in the air in a distance of 320nm the tilt angle is to be set to -1.0 degrees, for 160nm the tild angle should be set to -1.5 degrees, for 80nm -3.5 degrees and for 40nm -6 degrees. With a tilt angle of -0.5 degrees the weather radar beam would not hit a zone of high reflectivity meaning the probability of a return depicted on the navigation display is low.

Analysis of the flight data showed that the autopilot would have remained connected throughout the event had it not been disconnected manually, the autopilot would have corrected the overspeed keeping the aircraft below or at 35,200 feet.

The overspeed warning has highest priority and results in a master warning that can not be cancelled. The cavalry charge indicative of the autopilot disconnect was therefore suppressed as was the altitude alert. The BEA annotated that on newer aircraft like the B787 or A388 the autopilot calvary charge (aural alert) continues to sound until it is cancelled by a pilot other than on the A340, the autopilot disconnect aural alert therefore would have sounded as soon as the overspeed condition terminated.

The BEA released safety recommendations to improve pilot training for monitoring flight parameters during turbulence or overspeed conditions and for operating the weather radar.

The BEA released another safety recommendation to EASA to require the autopilot disconnect aural alarm become continuous until cancelled by human action, reasoning that the A340 cavalry charge by design sounds 1.5 seconds and may therefore be suppressed by a higher priority aural alert. This suppression had contributed to a critical incident, the BEA continued.

The BEA further demanded the cockpit voice recorder capacity to increase beyond 2 hours in order to store a complete long haul flight arguing that currently capacities of up to 10 hours are readily available at the market and thus should be required.


Гарнаев Александр Юрьевич

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The airline confirmed the return as a precaution due to a "very strong smell" on board.
The cause of the smell is under investigation.

Ну дык а что именно был за запах-то, а-а ?... Чем же так воняло ???


Stanislav

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Incident: Ural A320 at Khudzhand on Nov 1st 2012, rejected takeoff
By Simon Hradecky, created Saturday, Nov 3rd 2012 15:11Z, last updated Saturday, Nov 3rd 2012 15:11Z

A Ural Airlines Airbus A320-200, registration VP-BQZ performing flight U6-2926 from Khudzhand (Tajikistan) to Ufa (Russia), rejected takeoff from Khudzhand due to the failure of the left hand engine (CFM56) and returned to the apron.


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Incident: Rusline CRJ2 near Moscow on Nov 3rd 2012, anti-ice failure
By Simon Hradecky, created Sunday, Nov 4th 2012 18:43Z, last updated Sunday, Nov 4th 2012 18:43Z

A Rusline Canadair CRJ-200, registration VQ-BND performing flight 7R-533 from Moscow Domodedovo to Orsk (Russia), was climbing through FL090 out of Moscow when the crew reported an anti-ice system failure and decided to return to Moscow, where the aircraft landed safely on runway 32R about 20 minutes later.

A replacement CRJ-200 reached Orsk with a delay of 4 hours.


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Incident: Virgin A333 over Atlantic on Nov 4th 2012, fracture of spoiler
By Simon Hradecky, created Sunday, Nov 4th 2012 18:13Z, last updated Sunday, Nov 4th 2012 18:22Z

A Virgin Atlantic Airbus A330-300, registration G-VKSS performing flight VS-76 (Dep Nov 3rd) from Orlando,FL (USA) to Manchester,EN (UK) with 330 people on board, was enroute at FL390 over the Atlantic when a loud bang was heard on the aircraft without any recogniseable reason at first. The crew therefore continued the flight, but later needed to declare PAN reporting handling problems. The crew decided to divert to Shannon, upon contacting Shannon Approach the crew requested right hand wide turns and an extended period of time at 5000 feet to read the checklists, configure the aircraft and verify aircraft handling. Following the checks the crew reported they did not expect any difficulties for landing and proceeded for a safe landing on runway 24 at a rather normal speed and taxied to the apron with emergency services following the aircraft to the stand to check the brakes.

Passengers reported the captain announced some time after the bang, that they had a technical problem and vibrations may be felt throughout the aircraft. Later the crew indicated a spoiler had fractured and they were burning more fuel than normal as a result.


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Incident: Aerolineas Argentinas A342 and Jetblue A320 over Colombia on Nov 2nd 2012, TCAS resolution
By Simon Hradecky, created Monday, Nov 5th 2012 22:56Z, last updated Monday, Nov 5th 2012 23:07Z

An Aerolineas Argentinas Airbus A340-200, registration LV-ZPX performing flight AR-1303 from Miami,FL (USA) to Buenos Aires Ezeiza,BA (Argentina), was enroute at FL350 about 100nm north of Bogota (Colombia) tracking airway UA301 southbound.

A Jetblue Airbus A320-200, registration N519JB performing flight B6-1784 from Bogota (Colombia) to Orlando,FL (USA), was enroute at FL340 tracking northbound about 100nm north of Bogota, when the flight was cleared to climb to FL360.

Shortly after, at approximately 17:05Z, both aircraft received TCAS resolution advisories instructing the A342 to climb and the A320 to descend. According to TCAS the minimum vertical separation was 200 feet. The A342 became clear of conflict while climbing through FL355, the A320 received clear of conflict while descending through FL345.

Both aircraft continued to their destinations for safe landings.


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Incident: American B772 near New York on Jan 20th 2011, near collision with USAF C-17s
By Simon Hradecky, created Thursday, Aug 2nd 2012 20:46Z, last updated Tuesday, Nov 6th 2012 11:45Z

The NTSB released their factual report stating a miscommunication between the civil air traffic controller working New York ARTCC sector 86 and the military controller controlling the two C-17s also within New York's sector 86 permitted the Boeing 777 to be cleared to FL220 while the C-17s were cleared to descend from FL250 to FL220.

The conflict was indicated by a collision alert issued by the civil radar to both controllers. The conflict alert activated at the same time when AA-951 received TCAS resolution advisories and the C-17s, configured to receive traffic advisories only, received traffic advisories. AA-951 received a TCAS RA to descend followed by a second RA in quick succession now requiring the crew to climb. The C-17s did not change their trajectory.

The closest distance between AA-951 and the closest C-17s was 0 feet vertical and 0.38nm horizontally.

The NTSB reported the second C-17 followed the first C-17 about 4000 feet behind and 500 feet to the right of the first aircraft.

On Nov 6th 2012 the NTSB released their final report concluding:

Incomplete and incorrect coordination between air traffic controllers that resulted in the 777 and the two C17s being cleared to maintain the same altitude. Contributing to the incident was the controllers’ non-adherence to established communications phraseology and incorrect data entry into the radar data blocks for each aircraft.


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Incident: Red Wings T204 at Ekaterinburg on Nov 5th 2012, overran runway on landing
By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Nov 6th 2012 12:18Z, last updated Tuesday, Nov 6th 2012 12:18Z

A Red Wings Tupolev TU-204, registration RA-64043 performing flight WZ-105 from Moscow Vnukovo to Ekaterinburg (Russia), landed on Ekaterinburg's runway 26L (length 3025m/9920 feet) in heavy snowfall at 20:38L (14:38Z) but overran the end of the runway with the nosewheel by about half a meter. No injuries and no damage occurred, the runway however was closed for about an hour until the aircraft was towed off the runway.

Following landing the commander of the flight requested an immediate measurement of the friction coefficients complaining the reported braking action did not match actual braking action.

The airport said, the runway was ready to receive the aircraft in accordance with required standards.

The Ural Transport Investigation Office stated the aircraft overran the end of the runway by about half a meter as result of wet snow on the runway.

Metars:
USSS 051600Z 17001MPS 7000 -SHSN FEW005 OVC007CB 00/M00 Q1011 NOSIG RMK QFE738 26590330
USSS 051530Z 18002MPS 7000 -SHSN FEW005 OVC010CB 00/00 Q1012 TEMPO 0500 +SHSN BKN002 BKN010CB RMK QFE738 26590330
USSS 051500Z 17002MPS 4100 -SHSN FEW004 OVC012CB 00/00 Q1012 TEMPO 0500 +SHSN BKN002 BKN010CB RMK QFE738 26590330
USSS 051430Z 16002MPS 4800 -SHSN SCT004 OVC007CB 00/M00 Q1012 TEMPO 0500 +SHSN BKN002 BKN010CB RMK QFE739 26590330
USSS 051400Z 15002MPS 1700 R08R/2600 SHSN BKN002 OVC011CB 00/M00 Q1013 TEMPO 0500 +SHSN BKN002 BKN010CB RMK QBB080 QFE740 58590330
USSS 051330Z 15002MPS 0900 R08R/1300V2500N +SHSN BKN003 OVC008CB 00/M00 Q1013 TEMPO 0500 +SHSN BKN002 BKN010CB RMK QBB100 QFE740 58590330
USSS 051300Z 14003MPS 1700 R08R/2700 SHSN BKN003 OVC007CB 00/M00 Q1013 TEMPO 0500 +SHSN BKN002 BKN010CB RMK QFE740 58590330
USSS 051230Z 14003MPS 4200 -SHSN BKN005 OVC008CB 00/M00 Q1013 TEMPO 0500 +SHSN BKN002 BKN010CB RMK QFE740 58590330
USSS 051200Z 14002MPS 4100 -SHSN BKN004 OVC007CB 00/M00 Q1014 TEMPO 0500 +SHSN BKN002 BKN010CB RMK QFE740 58590330
USSS 051130Z 13003MPS 2200 -SHSN BKN003 OVC007CB 00/M00 Q1014 TEMPO 0500 +SHSN BKN002 BKN010CB RMK QFE741 58590330
USSS 051100Z 12003MPS 1900 SHSN VV004 00/M00 Q1014 TEMPO 0500 +SHSN BKN002 BKN010CB RMK QFE741 5829//50


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Incident: Ryanair B738 near Pisa on Jul 6th 2011, first officer incapacitated
By Simon Hradecky, created Tuesday, Nov 6th 2012 15:09Z, last updated Tuesday, Nov 6th 2012 15:09Z

Spain's CIAIAC released their final report in Spanish on pages 57-71 (English version pages 167-180) of their quarterly bulletin concluding the probable cause of the incident was:

the sudden incapacitation of the copilot. Medically the event was classified as a syncope, likely caused by prolonged heat exposure. There were no indications in either the copilot’s medical history or in follow-up tests to suggest that the syncope could have been anticipated.

CIAIAC reported that the aircraft was about 30 minutes into the flight when the first officer (33, CPL, 4,000 hours total, 2,050 hours on type) informed the captain (39, ATPL, 9,000 hours total, 7,000 hours on type) that he was feeling sick and suffered from head ache handing controls to the captain. Moments later the first officer felt dizziness and tremors, no longer responded to questions by the captain and eventually became unconscious. The captain requested a flight attendant to the cockpit to take care of the first officer, the first officer was treated with oxygen. In the meantime the captain declared medical emergency with Marseille Center (France) and requested to divert to Girona. The first officer was stabilised, regained consciousness about 4-5 minutes after becoming unconscious, but remained incapacitated. The aircraft landed safely on Girona's runway 20 about 45 minutes after the first officer handed the controls to the captain. Following an initial assessment by medical services the first officer was taken to a hospital, where medical tests confirmed there was no serious health problem. The first officer was discharged from the hospital soon after.

CIAIAC reported the cause of fainting was given by the hospital as "vasovagal syncope", the most common form of fainting as result of a stimulus to the vagus nerve resulting in reduction of heart rate and dilation of blood vessels via the parasympathetic system. This causes less blood being delivered to the brain and fainting. Typically, unconsciousness is short and recovery is quick after changing body position.

CIAIAC reported that the captain reported a medical emergency with Marseille without indicating the medical emergency concerned the first officer. Only after contact Girona Approach, upon being queried about the nature of the medical emergency, the captain reported the first officer was incapacitated and the aircraft was in "single pilot operation". This information was forwarded to Girona Tower, who asked whether they should deploy the trucks (fire services), approach suggested that wasn't necessary as it was a medical emergency only.

The CIAIAC analysed that Ryanair did provide simulator training for commander incapacitation, however, had not provided training for first officer incapacitation. The commander immediately reacted to the first officer's first indications of health deterioration and took control of the aircraft without any disruption of the aircraft handling. He requested the purser to the flight deck to provide first aid to the first officer, however, he did not relay the fact to ATC, that the first officer had been incapacitated causing the impression with ATC that a passenger had a medical emergency. When French ATC queried to state the nature of emergency, the captain still maintained it was just a medical emergency. Only on approach to Girona the captain revealed the aircraft was down to single pilot operation. The CIAIAC states that there was lack of clarity in the procedures permitting the captain to focus on the medical side of the events but did not perceive the situation affecting the safety of the flight.

On the ground there was confusion about how to respond to the emergency following the captain's revelation of a pilot incapacitation. The plans for passenger medical emergency were carried out rather than the aircraft in emergency response plans. The confusion arose out of the captain's continued wording "medical emergency" which is generally understood as not affecting safety of the flight, although following the revelation of a single pilot operation it should have been clear this was an emergency affecting safety of the flight.

CIAIAC released three safety recommendations as result of the investigation:
- Ryanair should introduce a scenario of first officer incapacitation into their simulator training
- Ryanair should review their operating manual in order to provide for emergency declaration in case of flight crew member incapacitation and purser involvement in reading checklists prior to landing
- AENA (Spanish Airport Operator) should verify all ATC personnel and personnel in focal points of airports being aware that flight crew incapacitation must be treated as declared emergency in flight and thus activate the emergency response plans.


Гарнаев Александр Юрьевич

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An Emirates Airlines Airbus A380-800, registration A6-EDA performing flight EK-413 from Sydney,NS (Australia) to Dubai (United Arab Emirates), was climbing out of Sydney's runway 34L when upon contacting departure the crew declared PAN reporting they needed to shut the #3 engine (GP7270, inboard right hand) down and requested to stop climb at FL110 and continue on planned track until decision was made whether to return or continue, controller indicating the aircraft was needed higher to not leave controlled air space, the aircraft subsequently climbed to FL160 and FL190. The crew subsequently decided to return to Sydney, dumped fuel and landed safely on runway 34L about 90 minutes after departure.

The flight was cancelled, the passengers were rebooked onto other flights.

Passengers describe a loud bang was heard on board of the aircraft and streaks of flame were seen from the engine. Other passengers initially saw a flash and heard a bang and believed they had been hit by lightning. All passengers said the aircraft jolted.

The airline confirmed an engine fault and said, the passengers were rebooked onto other flights.

The engine is being replaced.

Engineers checking engine #3 (Photo: SallyAnne Betteridge):



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